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Does Europe 
really need Ukraine?
Until recently, there was only one answer:
no. The Europeans thought that Ukraine
did not deserve much attention, being a
problem area where something really bad
and strange was taking place—Kolchugas
disappeared, weapons exploded and arms
were spread worldwide, everybody was
talking about violation of human rights
and freedom of speech, and there was an
uncontrolled inflow of migrants.
Meanwhile, the country was pestering
Europe with demands to join the
European Union. In this situation, the
only rational way out for the EU was to
build a strong border, define Ukraine’s
place beyond the border and forget about
those bothersome demands. 
What makes 
this answer so popular?
This attitude is actually a consequence
of EU policy in the early 90s, which was
focused on returning to Europe those
countries that became communist after
World War II. These were the countries
that had, in fact, been conceded to one
of the winners in the war and thus lay
on Western Europe’s conscience. 
This concession had been made to
maintain the order, to help Russia keep
control over other republics in the
Soviet Union. Nobody thought that
Ukraine might become an independent
political player. 
How has EU enlargement
changed this answer?
Absolutely. The acceptance of new
members into the EU altered the
geopolitical balance that had been in
effect since World War II, both for the
EU and for Ukraine’s neighbors. The EU
has become the largest and most
powerful entity in Europe and one of
the most influential entities in the
world. The EU border has come closer to
Ukraine and Russia, and new neighbors
have become a new reality that is hard
to miss. 
A new balance between countries and
unions still has to be built. Ukraine is
one of the critical points in the “balance1
imbalance” formula. For the first time in
recent centuries, Ukraine has a neighbor
larger than Russia, and the country is
trying to gain independence and leave
the Russia’s sphere of influence by, for
example, joining NATO. Ukraine is taking
active efforts to indicate its shift toward
the EU and the country is slowly being
recognized as an independent political
unit.
What are the risks of missing a
new EU policy towards Ukraine? 
Currently Ukraine looks very stable:
despite a recent history of violations
and confrontations, the country has
not shed blood. Ukraine has managed
to maintain stability despite the lack of
international technical assistance for
developing democratic institutions and
infrastructure. Somehow, Ukrainians
have drawn on their own reserves to
reach the best indicators in terms of
democracy compared to many other NIS
countries who also did not receive any
technical assistance within the
framework of acceding to the EU—and
the country even has a steady economic
boom. Yet, it is clear that Ukraine is not
on the EU screen the way, say, the
Balkans are. Critically, Ukraine’s stability
is based on a policy of dynamic balance
that could easily be disrupted through
the actions or even inactions of the
country’s neighbors.
Today Ukraine finds itself at the
interstice between the two centers of
power. Russia has proved unable to
curtail chaos within its own borders
through democratic means and has
returned to the “strong hand” approach.
At the same time, it is increasing
economic and political pressure on
Ukraine in order to pull this country
back to its orbit. 
The European Union has been making
demands of Ukraine in terms of
developing a real market economy and
democracy, but it has not offered
anything constructive to develop
Ukraine’s capacities for further
democratic transformations.
This balance could be tipped very
quickly. Once Russia’s pressure is not
balanced by EU actions any more, it
could result in serious conflicts and
even wars in this multi1ethnic and
multi1confessional country, as has
repeatedly happened in the history of
Ukraine’s relations with Poland and
Russia. The lion’s share of the Ukrainian
population will stand against
integration with Russia, to the point of
taking weapons into their hands. 
Should it come to this, instead of a zone
of stability, the EU could find itself
facing a conflict involving large armies
along its borders.
An undemocratic and unreformed
Ukraine will be a source of trouble
• Ukraine could start to distribute
nuclear technologies and materials and
sell weapons to “problem” countries
and groups.
• Migration from and through Ukraine
could become uncontrolled.
• Ukraine could prove unable to protect
its own environment because of poorly
controlled and outdated technologies.
The European Union’s policy of rejecting Ukraine should be reviewed. Guided by
the stereotypes that Ukraine does not accept democratic norms, the EU does
not see the country’s real political success and potential, all of which can be
transformed into additional advantages for Europe. The EU should apply its
experience of providing Technical Assistance to new EU member&countries for
the purpose of building a democratic society to Ukraine as well. These ideas
were emphasized in a report by ICPS Director Vira NANIVSKA at Yalta European
Seminar (YES) dedicated to issues of the EU Partnership Policy, which took
place at the Livadia Palace on 2 July 2004
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• Ukraine could become a barrier to the
free movement of goods (lack of
pipelines, highways and so on).
• Political instability and/or ethnic
clashes could lead to the emergence
of armed conflict.
The Ukraine Europe doesn’t know
Ukraine is the democratic leader in
the CIS. “Nations in Transit,” a study by
Freedom House, revealed that a country’s
democratization index correlates directly
to its status in relation to EU
membership and the approach to TA
taken towards it.
The first group included countries who
were preparing to join the EU and who
were granted the entire range of TA. 
The second group was countries who got
on the accession track recently, after
which their basic indicators have
dramatically improved. The countries in
the third group were not included in the
accession process, did not receive TA for
democratic institution1building and
infrastructure development, and most
have reverted to autocracy.
Ukraine belongs to the third group, the
“outsiders.” It has the highest
indicators among countries not being
considered for EU membership and is
catching up with the weakest countries
in the second group.
Violations of democratic principles have
emerged from two contradictory factors.
The main style of political behavior
inherited by Ukraine’s politicians was the
old soviet style of back1room deal1 and
throat1cutting. Yet competing groups
have been legitimized in the Verkhovna
Rada majority and its opposition. 
A Kuchma1led coalition controls the
Government and has a majority in the
legislature, while opposition forces
control 45% of the seats.
The Administration also controls the
media and harasses businesses. 
The opposition engages in fisticuffs in
the legislature, resorts to street protests
and threatens to carry out a massive
“clean1up” operation if it comes to
power. Both approaches are ineffective.
The Administration will not listen, and
the opposition will not back up its
criticisms. This makes it hard for voters
to understand and to choose. 
A no1holds1barred competition has a
negative impact on the overarching and
complicated tasks of government policy,
which need broad1based coordination.
Political competition is good for the
country. Nevertheless, even this rough
but open competition among
independent political forces is raising
the quality of the country’s politics and
affects both domestic and foreign policy.
The ruling coalition has been forced to
adopt winning ideas from the opposition:
absolute priority of Ukraine’s
independence and national interests,
European integration, NATO membership,
and European standards of governance.
It has become harder to pass odious
decisions against the national interests.
Competition means that politicians are
more and more in the public eye. 
The various sides are getting used to
publicly criticizing one another.
Factors of economic revival. 
The Ukrainian population is “getting”
what business and market conditions
mean. At the same time, a better price
situation in global markets has led to an
increase in external trade and investment
activity in the country. Ukraine is in the
midst of an active process of privatization
and the prosperity of its consumers is
growing. For all intents and purposes, the
country is financially stable. 
What can Ukraine do for the EU?
Ukraine could become the leader in the
Black Sea region. Earlier, the closest the
EU got to the Sea was Greece; soon, it
will have Romania and Bulgaria and it
already has friendly neighbors in Turkey
and Ukraine, as well as possibly Georgia.
This all opens the way to the Caucasus,
the Middle East and Central Asia, as well
as common interests with Northern
African countries. 
In this group, Ukraine turns out to be one
of the largest country, with a powerful
scientific and technical potential. 
The country is rapidly gaining experience
in political competition, and inter1ethnic
and inter1confessional balance. 
Ukraine could become the core of
stability on the EU’s eastern borders and
a convenient traffic center between the
EU, the Caucasus and Asia. Ukraine
could also be an agent of EU cultural
influence on Russia, the Caucasus, the
Middle East and Central Asia.
What can the EU do for Ukraine?
The EU can provide task$oriented
support for transformation. An
important component for supporting
this fragile balance is helping Ukraine 
to develop its capacities. The country
needs assistance in establishing the
democratic basis of political
competition which, unlike other non1
accession post1soviet countries, is a
reality of public life in Ukraine. Help is
needed to establish institutions of day1
to1day democracy in the country in
order to ensure public support for
change. A more modern business
infrastructure also needs to be
developed to make it possible to resist
the economic expansion of Russia.
The EU can apply its TA approach with
other CEE countries. The goals of
technical assistance for accession
countries were defined as democratic
institution1building and infrastructure
development for investment and
business. In these countries, TA project
outputs were tangible: different training
programs were carried out and all kinds
of manuals developed for civil servants
of every government level. Each local
government had to develop a strategic
plan for its budget and to publish public
policy papers on its strategic priorities.
A mandatory list of dozens of manuals
was developed, among them: The Audit
Manual; Oversight of Local Government
Finance; Outsourcing Municipal Services;
and Public Private Partnership in
Municipal Services.
Nothing like this has ever happened
within any EU technical assistance
projects in Ukraine. Getting the EU to
provide TA that is structured the way it
was for accession countries—to ensure
the building of democratic institutions
and the development of infrastructure—
must be Ukraine’s top priority.
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New on the ICPS website
Recent arrivals at www.icps.kiev.ua:
• economic statistics No. 44 
(June 2004) in English and Ukrainian;
• political commentary No. 13 
(July 2004) in English and Ukrainian.
To receive this information regularly you
may subscribe at our site.
